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A Tale of Two Standards: Antitrust, the
Public Interest, and the Television
Industry
by EDWARD P. SANGSTER*
I
Introduction
In two cases, both named United States v. National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters,' individual broadcasters found them-
selves caught in the middle of a tug-of-war between two
governmental departments regarding restrictions on television
commercials. While one branch of government, the Justice De-
partment, seeks to promote competitive advertising practices
regardless of the possible increase in the commercialization of
television, another governmental agency, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC or Commission), has traditionally
penalized broadcasters for allowing too many commercials.
2
Competitive forces may compel broadcasters to increase the
amount of commercial time, but in doing so stations may vio-
late the FCC's public interest requirement and conceivably
lose their licenses if they become overly commercialized.
3
Complicating the issue, the FCC recently removed its formal
restrictions on television advertising.4 It is now unclear
whether broadcasters have any duty to limit advertising.5
By examining the decisions in Broadcasters I and Broadcast-
ers II, this note analyzes the two standards of public interest
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The author wishes to express his gratitude to Richard, Nancy, and Sally for their abun-
dant moral support.
1. United States v. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149 (D.D.C. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Broadcasters I]; United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 553
F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Broadcasters II.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 100-20.
3. Id. See also notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
4. Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Re-
quirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, Final
Rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 33,588 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Final Rule].
5. See infra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
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which have been applied to the broadcasting industry: one
standard dictated by antitrust law and the other mandated by
the Communications Act.6 The note examines the results of
applying the antitrust laws to the television industry and con-
trasts this with the result that the policies of the Communica-
tions Act7 might favor. The note then discusses the
ramifications of Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II, which led
to the repeal of the Television Code of the National Association
of Broadcasters,8 in light of the recent deregulation of televi-
sion advertising.9 The note concludes that the Broadcasters
decisions have substantially undermined the FCC's rationale
for deregulating television advertising.
II
Background
The Federal Communications Commission is vested with the
power to issue, renew, or revoke licenses to broadcast. 10 The
FCC issues new broadcasting licenses to individuals or compa-
nies that the FCC determines are likely to operate in the public
interest." At least once every five years, a television station
must renew its license. 12 The FCC will renew the license only if
the station operated in the public interest during the prior li-
cense period.
3
Although the government requires stations to operate in the
public interest, it has never provided specific guidelines to as-
sist broadcasters in fulfilling their public interest require-
ment.'4 It is clear, however, that the FCC has traditionally
6. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1983).
7. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1983).
8. THE TELEVISION CODE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS (19th
ed. amended Sept. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CODE], reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN BROADCASTING 576 (F. Kahn 3d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Kahn].
9. See infra notes 131-71 and accompanying text.
10. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1983).
11. Id. § 307(a).
12. Id. § 307(c).
13. Id.
14. The statutory standard no doubt leaves wide discretion and calls for imagi-
native interpretation. Not a standard that lends itself to application with ex-
actitude, it expresses a policy, born of years of unhappy trial and error, that is
"as concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of dele-
gated authority permit."
FCC v. R.C.A. Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953) (quoting F.C.C. v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940)). See also Note, The Proposed Communica-
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regarded excessive advertising as detrimental to the public
interest.15
In 1923, licensed broadcasters formed the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (NAB), a voluntary industry trade associ-
ation. 6 The NAB established a code of conduct for its
members in 1952. The Television Code of the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters (Code) has been updated several times,
most recently in 1978.17 It set forth eight standards regarding
programming and seven standards regarding television adver-
tising. The programming standards dealt with the type and
length of programs, provided standards regarding children's
programming, and required conformity to a general standard
of good taste. 8 The advertising standards regulated the total
amount of time devoted to commercials, the number of consec-
utive commercials, and the number of program interruptions,
and provided general guidelines regulating good taste, decep-
tive advertising, and the making of representations regarding
health and safety. 9
All NAB members and many nonmembers subscribed to, or
followed, the Code;20 in 1978, these stations comprised more
than sixty-five percent of all commercial television stations.21
Furthermore, Code-subscribing stations adhered strictly to the
Code's time limits regarding advertising; an NAB study
tions Act Rewrite: Potomac Deregulatory Fever v. The Public Interest, 48 CIN. L. REV.
476, 480 (1979).
15. See infra notes 100-20 and accompanying text.
16. Kahn, supra note 8, at 63.
17. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 152 n.2. The NAB's membership includes the
three major networks and over 500 independent television stations. Id.
18. CODE, supra note 8, at 576. The NAB refused to release copies of the 1978
amended Code, which also was the subject of Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II.
However, the two pertinent provisions are essentially the same. See generally Bros-
terhous, United States v. National Association of Broadcasters: The Deregulation of
Sef-Regulation, 35 FED. COM. L.J. 313 (1983).
"Family viewing hours" standards, which were enacted by the NAB in 1975, were
held to constitute an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights. Writers
Guild of Am. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 609
F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). The lower court found that
because the FCC was extensively involved in enacting them, the regulations consti-
tuted governmental censorship. That court's decision was vacated, however, on the
grounds that the FCC, not the federal courts, had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs com-
plaints. See also infra note 179.
19. CODE, reprinted in Kahn, supra note 8, at 576. See also Broadcasters I, 536 F.
Supp. at 153 n.10.
20. The public watched 85% of its television on Code-subscribing stations. Broad-




showed that, in a sample consisting of over 71,000 hours of tele-
vision broadcast by NAB members, the stations complied with
the advertising time limits during over ninety-nine percent of
those hours.22
The NAB promulgated and enforced its specific standards
ostensibly to assist members in meeting their public interest
requirement. The government, through the FCC, tacitly ac-
cepted the NAB's standards.23 In some instances, compliance
with the Code essentially satisfied certain aspects of the broad-
casters' public interest requirement.24
In July of 1979, the U.S. Department of Justice filed an anti-
trust suit against the NAB under section 4 of the Sherman
Act.25 Most provisions of the Code did not restrain competi-
tion, as the Code attempted to increase program quality while
at the same time protect viewers from deceptive advertising
and questionable representations concerning health and
safety. The government, however, contended that three of the
NAB Code restrictions dealing with commercials unreasonably
restrained trade.26 It argued that the Code restricted the avail-
able amount of commercial time; consequently, the price of ad-
vertising remained artificially high.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
government with regard to one restriction, which prevented
the advertising of more than one product during commercials
less than sixty seconds in duration.28 In so ruling, the court
ignored the role that the Code played in helping NAB mem-
bers satisfy their public interest requirement. While it recog-
nized that, for the most part, the Code was promulgated to
provide "broadcasters with guidelines for meeting their statu-
tory obligation 29 to serve the public interest,"30 the court stated
22. Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, Revision of Programming and
Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment Requirements, and Program Log Require-
ments for Commercial Television Stations, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,239, app. C (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Revision of Commercialization Policies].
23. See, e.g., In re NBC, 20 F.C.C.2d 644, para. 5 (1969). Compliance with the NAB
total commercial time limit created a rebuttable presumption that the broadcaster had
satisfied that aspect of its public interest requirement.
24. Id.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1973).
26. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 152.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 163.
29. The "statutory obligation" the court referred to is set forth in 47 U.S.C. §§ 307
and 309 (1983).
30. Broadcasters 1, 536 F. Supp. at 153 n.10. See generally CODE, supra note 8.
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that it could not consider the beneficial aspects of the Code
when evaluating whether the provision unreasonably re-
strained trade."
The NAB appealed the summary judgment ruling, but before
a decision was rendered, the Justice Department and the NAB
settled the case. The NAB agreed to rescind its Code and
agreed to the entry of an unfavorable consent decree. In re-
turn, the Justice Department agreed not to oppose the motion
of the NAB to dismiss the summary judgment as moot.
32
The Tunney Act 33 requires that settlement of antitrust cases
be approved by the district court. Under the Act, a court may
approve the consent decree only if the entry of a consent de-
cree would be in the "public interest. '34 In approving the con-
sent decree between the Justice Department and the NAB, the
court in Broadcasters II construed the public interest to con-
sist exclusively of two factors: the policy of encouraging settle-
ment of antitrust cases and the policy of increasing
competition. As it had done in granting summary judgment
in Broadcasters I, the court ignored the possibility that the pro-
visions of the Code might have served the public interest as
defined by the Communications Act.
3 6
In order to understand the court's ruling, it is necessary to
first examine the antitrust law on which the court based its de-




Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 3 Although the stat-
ute expressly prohibits "[e] very contract, combination ... or
31. Broadcasters 1, 536 F. Supp. at 166-68.
32. Broadcasters II, 553 F. Supp. at 622.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982).
34. Id. See generally Note, Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Recon-
ciling Judicial Responsibility with Executive Discretion, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 133 (1983).
35. Broadcasters II, 553 F. Supp. at 623-24. The same judge who granted summary
judgment in Broadcasters I approved the consent decree.
36. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1983).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973).
No. 41
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conspiracy, in restraint of trade,"3 8 the Supreme Court has con-
strued the statute to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of
trade. 9 This interpretation of the statute is called the "rule of
reason."
40
In Board of Trade v. United States,41 the Supreme Court ar-
ticulated the following test for determining whether a restraint
will be deemed unreasonable.
[T] he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be deter-
mined by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition.
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The
true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition
or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competi-
tion. To determine that question the court must ordinarily con-
sider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was im-
posed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or prob-
able. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because
a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regula-
tion or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
42
Four types of agreements are considered to be unreasonable
per se: (1) price fixing,43 (2) market division agreements,"
38. Id.
39. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911).
40. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 65, at 171-74 (1977).
41. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
42. Id. at 238. Although Board of Trade states the classic test for determining
whether a restraint is unreasonable, its result is one of the foremost aberrations from
the evolution of antitrust law. The Board of Trade test supposedly restricted the
court's consideration of reasonableness to factors indicating whether the restraint de-
creased competition, but the Court apparently considered other factors as well.
In Board of Trade, the suspect restriction temporarily fixed the price of grain in
transit to Chicago by forbidding members of the exchange from buying grain when the
exchange was closed. The Court upheld the restriction, arguably on the basis that the
restraint was modest in comparison to the competing advantages. L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 40, § 65, at 177-79.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Price
fixing may consist of an explicit agreement to charge a certain price for a product.
More often, collaborators will engage in indirect methods to fix prices such as control-
ling the supply of a product. In Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 155-63, the court ana-
lyzed the alleged restriction under a supply limitation theory.
44. Market division agreements restrict competition by allocating certain sales ter-
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(3) group boycotts,45 and (4) tying agreements. 6 If a court cat-
egorizes an agreement as one of the four types of per se agree-
ments, a Sherman Act violation is conclusively established,
and a court need not inquire into the possible anticompetitive
effects of such a restriction.
Thus, there are two possible analyses used to determine
whether restraints of trade violate the Sherman Act. The
Supreme Court has characterized these restraints as falling
into one of two "complementary categories:"
In the first category are agreements whose nature and neces-
sary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate
study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality-
they are 'illegal per se.' In the second category are agreements
whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing
the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reasons why it was imposed.48
IV
Application of the Antitrust Laws to the NAB
The court applied both the per se rule and the rule of reason
in Broadcasters I, finding that the Code limitation concerning
the advertisement of more than one product during commer-
cials constituted an unlawful restraint of trade. It is important
to examine the reasoning the trial court used in both Broad-
casters I and Broadcasters III' in order to determine whether
the court properly applied antitrust law. These decisions in-
volved two motions heard by the same court. In the first, in-
volving a motion for summary judgment, the court used a
narrow definition of the public interest and found a per se vio-
ritories exclusively to certain producers or sellers. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), a.fd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
45. Group boycotts covered by the per se rule are difficult to define. In general,
group boycotts consist of concerted efforts by a group of businesspersons to prevent
other businesspersons from entering the level of business (for example, wholesale
trade) by denying potential entrants access to needed resources. Thus, a group of
wholesalers of "widgets" prevents other people from becoming widget wholesalers by
denying them access to widgets. See L. SuLLrvAN, supra note 40, at 229-65. See also
Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
46. "[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other sup-
plier." Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
47. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
48. Id.
49. For another discussion of the court's rulings, see Brosterhous, supra note 18.
No. 41
COMM/ENT L. J.
lation of the Sherman Act.50 In the second, involving a motion
for approval of settlement and entry of a consent decree, the
same court employed the same narrow definition of public in-
terest to approve the terms of the settlement.5'
A. The Motion for Summary Judgment
The United States filed a complaint on July 14, 1979, alleging
that three provisions of the Television Code of the NAB vio-
lated section 1 of the Sherman Act.52 The first restrictions,
called "advertising standards" by the court, limited network-
affiliated stations to nine and one-half minutes of commercials
per hour during prime time and imposed similar time limits
during other specified periods.53 The second set of constraints
put at issue were labelled "program interruption standards,"
and these limited the number of consecutive announcements
during any interruption of a program. 54 During prime time,
network-affiliated stations could have four interruptions, dur-
ing which a station could broadcast a maximum of four com-
mercials and one noncommercial announcement. 5 The third
challenged restriction, referred to as the "multiple product
standard," prohibited the broadcasting of any commercial of
less than sixty seconds duration which advertised more than
one product.
5 6
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The govern-
ment argued that the questioned Code provisions restrained
the supply of advertising time. 7 As an artificial restriction of
supply, the Code allegedly raised the price of available adver-
50. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 163.
51. Broadcasters II, 553 F. Supp. at 625.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1. See Broadcasters II, 553 F. Supp. at 622.
53. CODE, reprinted in Kahn, supra note 8, at 590-91, § 2(A) (1), XV § 2. Prime time
was defined as "a continuous period of not less than 3 consecutive hours ... as desig-
nated by the station between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and midnght." Id. Stations not
affiliated with a network were permitted to have more advertising time per hour. Id.
Both independent and network affiliate stations had similar restrictions during chil-
dren's viewing hours. Id. Stations were limited to 12% minutes of commercials per
hour during weekday children's viewing hours and 9% minutes per hour during chil-
dren's viewing hours on the weekend. Id. The court did not define "children's pro-
grams," apparently feeling that such a distinction was irrelevant. See Broadcasters II,
553 F. Supp. at 624.
54. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 158-59.
55. Id. at 153-54. Public service announcements did not count as an
"announcement."
56. Id. at 154.
57. Id. at 152.
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tising time and, hence, constituted a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.58 The NAB primarily argued that the Code
served the public interest and that various governmental bod-
ies had endorsed the Code restrictions.59 The NAB also as-
serted that adherence to the Code was voluntary, that the
restrictions were advisory and not restrictive, and that the
Code had no anticompetitive purpose.6 0
Although the parties apparently felt that the three types of
restrictions presented identical issues, the court astutely ana-
lyzed each restriction separately.61 The court held that the ad-
vertising standards and the interruption standards were not
per se violations of the Sherman Act.62 Restraints of trade
which are not per se violations must then be evaluated under
the rule of reason. 3 Thus, the court found that the effects of
the advertising and the interruption standards on competition
presented triable issues of fact and denied both parties' mo-
tions for summary judgment with respect to these standards.64
In contrast, the court held that the multiple product standard
constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act.6 The court
reasoned that
this standard ... has the effect of compelling some, perhaps
many, advertisers to purchase more commercial time than
their economic interests might dictate. In thus artificially in-
creasing the demand for commercial time-and perhaps limit-
ing its supply as well. . .- the standard raises both the price of
time and the revenues of the broadcasters .... 66
In other words, the standard required advertisers who wished
to promote more than one product to purchase at least sixty
seconds of commercial time; without the Code restriction, such
advertisers might have purchased fewer seconds of advertising
to promote the same number of products.
The court focused exclusively on the restriction's possible ef-
fects on competition. The court dismissed the NAB's defenses
of voluntariness, 6 7 governmental approval,68 and lack of anti-
58. Id.
59. Id. at 166-69.
60. Id. at 163-66.
61. Id. at 154 n.18.
62. Id. at 157-59.
63. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
64. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 157-59.
65. Id. at 163.
66. Id. at 160.
67. Id. at 163-65. The court did not consider the defense that the Code was of a
No. 41
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competitive purpose. 9 Although the court realized that the of-
fending provisions of the Code might serve legitimate pur-
poses, it explicitly refused to consider the beneficial aspects of
the restrictions.
70
The court's refusal to consider alternative benefits provided
by competitive restrictions is mandated by the holding in Na-
tional Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.
71
This case enunciated the policy that in antitrust cases the pub-
lic interest is served solely by increasing competition and any
other considerations are irrelevant.72 This holding would logi-
cally apply to the case against the NAB. Had the court been
able to consider the possible benefits of the Code restriction,
its decision might have been different. In short, the narrow
conception of public interest mandated by the antitrust laws
compelled the court to find a per se violation, without consider-
ation of any other competing "public interests."
B. Approval of the Consent Decree
A consent decree is essentially a contract between the gov-
ernment and the defendant to terminate the antitrust litiga-
tion.73 Settling a case by consent decree can be advantageous
to the defendant. The Clayton Act 74 allows a plaintiff in a pri-
vate action for injuries stemming from an antitrust violation to
use the final judgment in an antitrust action brought by the
United States against the same defendant as prima facie evi-
dence of such violation.75 Thus, if judgment against the de-
fendant is entered in an antitrust suit brought by the United
States, private plaintiffs will find it very easy to establish an
antitrust violation. Private plaintiffs cannot, however, use a
voluntary nature. "It is, indeed, difficult to see why legal unenforceability or lack of
formal sanctions should be considered a valid defense." Id. at 164.
68. Id. at 168-69. The court stated that even if the NAB could show that certain
governmental entities approved of the Code, such approval did not exempt the NAB
from the scope of the antitrust laws. Such an exemption can be granted only by Con-
gress. Id.
69. Id at 165-66. The court noted that there was conflicting evidence regarding the
purpose of the Code. The court stated that in any case the government did not have to
present evidence of anticompetitive purpose if the Code had an anticompetitive effect.
70. Id. at 166-68.
71. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
72. Id.
73. S. REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973).




consent decree or consent judgment as prima facie evidence in
a later suit, if that judgment or decree was entered before any
testimony had been heard.7" "The purpose behind the consent
decree exception. . . is to induce prompt capitulation by anti-
trust defendants. 77
Understandably, the NAB wished to prevent potential pri-
vate plaintiffs from gaining such an advantage. After the court
ruled that the multiple product standard was a per se violation
of the Sherman Act, the parties entered a consent decree. By
its terms, the government agreed to forego the benefits of the
summary judgment if the NAB would simply eliminate the of-
fensive restrictions.78
The district court can only approve a consent judgment if it
finds that the entry of a consent judgment is in "the public in-
terest. ' 79 The statute does not define public interest, but a
brief examination of the background of the Tunney Act demon-
strates that it was intended to ensure that consent decrees
truly increase competition.80
1. Background of the Tunney Act
Before the enactment of the Tunney Act, many consent de-
crees were ineffective; compliance with the terms of the con-
sent decree often failed to increase competition,81 yet the
government, by the decree, waived the public's rights to gov-
ernmental enforcement.82 The Tunney Act was designed to
76. Id.
77. Broadcasters II, 553 F. Supp. at 623 n.5.
78. Id. at 625-27.
79. See also Brosterhous, supra note 18, at 335-36. For an excellent discussion of
the standards of judicial review of consent decrees before and after the passage of the
Tunney Act, see Note, supra note 34, at 135-42.
80. Eighty percent of all antitrust complaints filed by the Justice Department are
settled by the defendant agreeing to the entry of a consent decree. S. REP. No. 298, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973). A consent decree requires a defendant to comply with certain
conditions, but the defendant does not admit to having violated the antitrust laws. In
theory, the terms required by the consent decree eliminate the antitrust violation and
increase competition. Id.
81. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 24,597-98 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney). See
also Consent Decree Bills: Hearings on H.R. 9203, 9947, and S. 782 before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 103-25 (1973) (testimony of Dan McGurk) [hereinafter cited as Consent De-
cree Bills].
82. In one case, Congressman James Stanton alleged that a certain consent decree
merely required the defendant to change the name of the offending practice, but it did
not require abolition of the practice itself. Consent Decree Bills, supra note 81, at 46-61
(statement of James V. Stanton).
No. 41
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prevent ineffective consent decrees by exposing the negotia-
tion process to public scrutiny8 3 In addition to requiring a
sixty-day advance publication of the terms of the proposed
consent decree, the statute requires a court to evaluate inde-
pendently whether the judgment is in the public interest.84
The Tunney Act implicitly assumes that members of the Jus-
tice Department might negligently or intentionally draft inef-
fective consent decrees. Indeed, this theme was repeatedly
raised during the Congressional hearings to justify the need
for the legislation.85 Therefore, the drafters of the Act used the
words "public interest," clearly intending them to mean the
public interest as defined in antitrust case law.86 At one point
in the legislative process, the statute was amended to read "the
public interest as defined by law." The purpose of the amend-
ment was to "make it clear that the court is to define public
interest in accordance with the antitrust laws."87 Congress sub-
sequently deleted the words "as defined by law" in order "to
clarify the intention not to change case law construing the
'public interest' in cases involving the antitrust laws or anti-
trust provisions of other laws .... Preservation of antitrust
precedent rather than innovation in the usage of the phrase,
'public interest,' is, therefore, unambiguous."88
Thus, Congress intended that judicial precedent would guide
the courts in evaluating whether a consent decree is in the
public interest. In Broadcasters ,89 the court applied the defi-
nition of the public interest in antitrust law as set forth by the
Supreme Court in National Society of Professional Engineers
v. United States90 :
[T] he purpose of the [antitrust] analysis is to form a judgment
83. 119 CONG. REC. 24,597-99 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(f) (1982).
85. See, e.g., Consent Decree Bills, supra note 81, at 129 (testimony of Howard
Luric) ("Without suggesting that the Department [of Justice] is corrupt or rotten to
the core-neither of which it is-one can suggest that it is not free from improper polit-
ical influence."). Another witness testified, "By definition, antitrust violators wield
great influence and economic power. They often bring significant pressure to bear on
government, and even on the courts, in connection with the handling of consent de-
crees. The public is properly concerned whether such pressure results in settlements
which might shortchange the public interest." Id. (testimony of Hon. J. Skelly Wright,
cited in 119 CONG. REC. 24,597 (1973) (statement of Senator Tunney)).
86. S. REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1973).
87. Id. at 3.
88. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
89. 536 F. Supp. at 167.
90. 435 U.S. 679.
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about the competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to
decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public
interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry. Sub-
ject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy decision has
been made by the Congress.91
2. Application of the Tunney Act in Broadcasters II
In the context of antitrust consent decrees, the term public
interest acquires a much narrower meaning than it might
otherwise suggest. In evaluating whether the public interest is
served by a consent judgment, the court examines the record
of negotiation to ensure that the defendant has not unduly in-
fluenced the Department of Justice into accepting the agree-
ment and that the judgment will effectivelr further the goal of
the antitrust laws, i.e., increased competition.
Therefore, it appears that the court in Broadcasters II cor-
rectly excluded all information not relating to the competitive
impact of the consent decree.92 The question, then, is whether
the application of the narrow public interest furthered by the
Sherman Act has frustrated a broader, more pervasive public
interest-namely, the public interest governing broadcasting.
V
The Public Interest in Broadcasting
The Communications Act requires that radio and television
stations obtain a license in order to broadcast.93 The FCC has
great but not unlimited discretion in determining whether to
grant or renew a broadcast license.94
[T ]he Commission shall determine, in the case of each applica-
tion filed with it . . . , whether the public interest, conven-
ience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such
application, and, if the Commission... shall find that public
interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the
granting [of the license], it shall grant such application.95
"This mandate to the FCC to assure that broadcasters oper-
ate in the public interest is a broad one, a power 'not niggardly,
91. Id. at 692.
92. For example, the court ignored its effect on children's television. Broadcasters
II, 553 F. Supp. at 624. See also Brosterhous, supra note 18, at 322-28.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1983).
94. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 105 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1939), rev'd on
other grounds, 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1983).
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but expansive'. '96 It is clear that radio and television stations
must operate in the public interest,97 and the FCC will not re-
new the license of a station which has failed to meet this obli-
gation.98 It is not clear, however, what conduct comports with
the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Cases sel-
dom define these terms and rarely discuss any factors used to
determine whether a station has operated in the "public inter-
est." Furthermore, the deregulation of radio and recent dereg-
ulation of television indicate that traditional standards of
public interest may be changing.99
Although it has been said that "[t]his vague standard has
been used ... by FCC commissioners to justify whatever they
have chosen to do,"'0 ° the Federal Radio Commission (FRC or
Radio Commission) and its successor, the FCC, have, until re-
cently, consistently decried excessive advertising as being det-
rimental to the public interest. In 1928, the fledgling FRC
promulgated its first comprehensive interpretation of the ad-
mittedly vague standard of "public interest, convenience, and
necessity."'' °  Regarding advertising, the Radio Commission
said:
[W] hile it is true that broadcasting stations in this country are
for the most part supported or partially supported by advertis-
ers, broadcasting stations are not given these great privileges
[to broadcast] by the United States Government for the pri-
mary benefit of advertisers. Such benefit as is derived by ad-
vertisers must be incidental and entirely secondary to the
interest of the public.
0 2
Initially, then, the Radio Commission viewed advertising as
a necessary evil; stations needed advertising to financially sup-
port their programs, but the FRC believed commercials de-
tracted from programming which the stations were supposed
to present for the public benefit. 0 3 The FRC said, "[tihe em-
96. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
97. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
98. FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946). See also Report and Statement of
Policy Res: Commission en banc Programming Inquiry in Docket No. 91874, 44 F.C.C.
2303, 2310 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Report and Statement of Policy Res].
99. See infra notes 135-71 and accompanying text.
100. B. COLE & M. OETrINGER, RELUCTANT REGULATORS 4 (rev. ed. 1978).
101. Kahn, supra note 8, at 49-50.
102. Statement Made by the Commission on August 23, 1928, Relative to Public In-
terest, Convenience or Necessity, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 166 (1928), reprinted in Kahn,
supra note 8, at 53.
103. Id. at 50-55.
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phasis must be first and foremost on the interest, the conven-
ience and the necessity of the listening public, and not on the
interest, convenience, or necessity of the individual broad-
caster or the advertiser." 
10 4
Several years later, the FRC attempted to redefine and clar-
ify its interpretation of public interest. In re Application of
Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.'05 represents the best known of
the FRC's early interpretations of public interest, convenience,
and necessity. Regarding advertising, the FRC stated:
[T Ihe amount and character of advertising must be rigidly con-
fined within the limits consistent with the public service ex-
pected of the station.
The service to be rendered by a station may be viewed from
two angles, (1) as an instrument for the communication of in-
telligence of various kinds to the general public by persons
wishing to transmit such intelligence, or (2) as an instrument
for the purveying of intangible commodities consisting of en-
tertainment, instruction, education, and information to a listen-
ing public'106
Thus, the FRC continued to view advertising as a necessary
evil. It said, "The commission must, however, recognize that,
without advertising, broadcasting would not exist, and must
confine itself to limiting this advertising in an amount and in
character so as to preserve the largest possible amount of ser-
vice for the public."'1 7
In 1946, the FCC, acting under authority of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934,108 issued a policy statement regarding pro-
gramming, which is commonly referred to as the Blue Book.'
The Blue Book extensively analyzed problems arising from
"advertising excesses" in the broadcasting industry. In it, the
FCC reiterated the concerns of the Radio Commission regard-
ing the conflict between the public interest and advertise-
ments. The FCC noted that
the fact that advertisers have a legitimate interest and place in
the American system of broadcasting does not mean that
broadcasting should be run solely in the interest of the adver-
104. Id. at 55.
105. 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32 (1929), reprinted in Kahn, supra note 8, at 56.
106. Id. at 57.
107. Id. at 61.
108. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1983).
109. Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (Mar. 7, 1946), reprinted
in Kahn, supra note 8, at 132-216.
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tisers rather than that of the listeners. Throughout the history
of broadcasting, a limitation on the amount and character of
advertising has been one element of "public interest."10
Again, the Commission echoed the theme that advertising rep-
resented a necessary evil required to support programming,
which did, in fact, benefit the public.
The FCC further refined its conception of the public interest
in 1960. In an effort to assist private licensees to develop pro-
gramming that better served the public interest, the FCC de-
lineated fourteen specific factors which constitute "[t] he major
elements usually necessary to meet the public interest, needs
and desires of the community.""' "The principal ingredient of
such [public interest] obligation consists of a diligent, positive,
and continuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill the
tastes, needs, and desires of his [or her] service area.""' 2
In addition to the above guidelines regarding programming,
the FCC made general statements regarding commercials. The
FCC said that broadcasters should "take all reasonable meas-
ures to avoid abuses with respect to the total amount of time
devoted to advertising continuity as well as the frequency with
which regular programs are interrupted for advertising
messages."
113
In short, the FCC had set forth programming and advertising
standards which licensees must meet to comport with the pub-
lic interest. In contrast to the specific programming standards,
the advertising standards were very general. It is clear, how-
ever, that the FCC still considered the public interest to be fur-
thered by a minimization of commercial time and commercial
interruptions.
The FCC specifically defined these guidelines in 1970, when
it informally adopted a maximum limit on total commercial
110. Id. at 192.
111. Report and Statement of Policy Res, supra note 98, para. 39. Such elements
were enumerated:
(1) opportunity for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local
talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5) educational pro-
grams, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorialization by licensees, (8) polit-
ical broadcasts, (9) agricultural programs, (10) news programs, (11) weather
and market reports, (12) sports programs, (13) service to minority groups,
(14) entertainment programs.
Id.
112. Id. para. 32.
113. I& para. 36.
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time. l1 4 Later, the FCC formally adopted the standards"' and
the codification of these rules 116 and prescribed the maximum
total commercial time allowable on both radio and television."
7
The guidelines permitted a television station to broadcast a
maximum of sixteen minutes of commercials during each
hour."
18
Additionally, in 1974, the FCC stated that
[wjhile it is recognized that advertising is the sole economic
foundation of the American commercial broadcasting system
and that continued service to the public depends on broadcast-
ers' ability to maintain adequate revenues with which to fi-
nance programming, the Commission has a responsibility to
insure that the "public interest" does not become subordinate
to financial and commercial interests. 119
Thus, throughout the history of broadcast regulation, the
regulating authority consistently viewed advertising as an im-
position on the public interest. Until the deregulation of radio
114. This development is described in Deregulation of Radio, Notice of Inquiry and
Proposed Rule Making, 73 F.C.C.2d 457, para. 46 (1979) (letter of the Chief of the Broad-
cast Bureau to WXCL) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Inquiryl.
115. Delegation of Authority, Order, 43 F.C.C.2d 638 (1973).
116. 47 C.F.R. § 0.281(a) (7) (i)-(v) (1983). These regulations were amended, but can
be found at 47 C.F.R. § 0.283(a) (6) (1984). The amended regulations applied only to
television and allowed 20 minutes of advertising during 10% of the day in periods of
high demand for political advertising. The FCC recently repealed the amended regula-
tions. See infra notes 148-71 and accompanying text.
117. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 114, at 477 n.92 (text of old regulation). These
regulations took the form of guidelines imposed on the Broadcast Bureau. (There
were also programming guidelines which are not relevant to this note.) The FCC dele-
gated to the Broadcast Bureau authority to approve renewal or granting of licenses
unless the licensee proposed to broadcast more than 16 minutes of commercials each
hour. Any application failing to meet these standards had to be reviewed by the entire
Commission, rather than the Broadcast Bureau, before it could be approved. These
guidelines were intended to be mere procedural guidelines, but they evolved into de
facto regulations. For example, the FCC said, "We begin our review of the program-
ming and commercialization guidelines by reiterating that the guidelines as written
are theoretically procedural. However, it is clear that the delegations have taken on
substantive overtones, at least in the minds of commercial broadcasters." Revision of
Commercialization Policies, supra note 22, at 37,239, 37,246. The Commission also
noted, "The substantive significance of the guidelines is further highlighted by the fact
that the Commission has deferred to licensee discretion whenever the guidelines have
been met, even in the context of highly contested proceedings. See, e.g., KCOP Televi-
sion, Inc., 71 F.C.C.2d 1430 (1979); Commercial Radio Institute, Inc., 43 Rad. Reg. 2d 1247
(1978); Turner Communications, 46 Rad. Reg. [2d] 1646 (1980)." Id. at 37,246 n.33. Thus,
although the 16-minute limit is technically a procedural guideline, broadcasters regard
it as regulation.
118. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 114, at 477 n.92.
119. Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1974).
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and television,120 the FCC has viewed advertising as an intru-
sion that has been tolerated because it was necessary to sup-
port the programs.
VI
Conflicting Standards of Public Interest
It appears that two different standards of the public interest
have been applied to the television industry. Under the anti-
trust standard, the public interest is served by increasing com-
petition in the industry. In contrast, the Communications Act
standard of public interest governing the broadcasting indus-
try is much broader. This broader definition of public interest
seeks to maximize the pleasure and benefit the public derives
from the necessarily commercialized broadcasting industry.1
2 '
Two of the challenged NAB Code restrictions-the interrup-
tion and time standards 122-arguably served the public interest
as traditionally defined by the FCC. 2 The time standard vol-
untarily limited the "total time devoted to commercials." As
the court in Broadcasters I recognized, the FCC has treated
compliance with the NAB's time standards favorably in evalu-
ating compliance with the stations' public interest requirement
when considering applications for license renewal. 24 Simi-
larly, the interruption standard furthered an expressed policy
of the FCC by reducing "the frequency with which regular pro-
grams are interrupted for advertising messages."'25 A reduc-
tion in total time devoted to commercials will likely increase
viewer benefit and pleasure.
It is important to note that in deciding the motion for sum-
mary judgment, the court did not rule that the interruption and
time guidelines damaged the interest in competition; rather,
the court reserved that question for trial. 26 Nonetheless, with
the elimination of the NAB's standards after Broadcasters I
120. See infra notes 131-71 and accompanying text.
121. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-17 (1943). See also Report and Order, 84
F.C.C. 968, app. D, para. 4 (1981) ("Although the public interest has many elements, the
primary objective is broadcast service responsive to the wants and needs of the pub-
lic-what economists call consumer satisfaction.").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
123. See supra notes 93-120 and accompanying text.
124. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 169 (1982). See, e.g., In re NBC, 20 F.C.C.2d 1,
para. 12 (1974).
125. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
126. Broadcasters 1, 536 F. Supp. at 158-59.
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and Broadcasters II, it would appear that the antitrust public
interest standard, requiring increased competition at all costs,
outweighs the broader public interest which governs the
broadcasting industry.
In short, a rigid application of the antitrust laws abolished
the industry-imposed standards that promoted the public in-
terest as then defined by the FCC. Certainly, these restraints
may have reduced competition in the industry;127 however, the
irony is that one branch of government has frustrated the
stated goals of another. Not only has a correct application of
the antitrust laws damaged the goals of the FCC, but it has in-
terfered with the public interest promoted by the Communica-
tions Act.
The multiple-product standard is less defensible than the
time and interruption standards. The NAB asserted that the
multiple-product standard reduced "clutter" in the same way
that the interruption standard lessened it.128 The FCC has not
expressed a policy that specifically encourages restricting
thirty-second commercials to the advertisement of a single
product, as it has done with the time and interruption stan-
dards. Since the multiple-product standard is the only one of
the standards which does not further a goal explicitly en-
couraged by the FCC, it appears that the Communications Act
public interest standard has been damaged the least by its
abolition.
Nevertheless, the broader standard of public interest has
been damaged by application of the antitrust laws. The finding
of the court that the multiple-product standard was unreasona-
ble per se does not necessitate a conclusion that it was con-
trary to the Communications Act public interest standard. Yet,
in an effort to prevent further antitrust action, the NAB has
abandoned the Code in its entirety. 29 Thus, the courts in
Broadcasters I and Broadcasters H have replaced a broad, flex-
ible standard of public interest with a narrow, rigid standard,
i.e., competition. As a result, competitive forces may actually
deter individual broadcasters from serving the public interest
127. That issue, however, was never resolved by the court. Id.
128. Id. at 166 n.73. The court defined "clutter" as "the practice of scheduling an
excessive number of separate non-program announcements consecutively within a
single interruption as well as ... an excessive number of program interruptions." Id.
129. 104 BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 58.
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as traditionally defined by the FCC.13 °
Due to the recent deregulation of the radio and television in-
dustries, it might be argued that the FCC's historical aversion
to television commercialization has changed since Broadcast-
ers I and Broadcasters I1.131 The efforts to deregulate televi-
sion advertising proposed soon after Broadcasters II are based
on the theory that market forces can effectively regulate adver-
tising excesses.'32 Nevertheless, in deregulating television ad-
vertising, 3 3 the FCC has not posited that commercialization
promotes the public interest; rather, it has simply decided that
its regulations may not be necessary to determine the maxi-
mum level of commercialization that is consistent with the
public interest. 134 Levels of advertising below the maximum
which the market forces will allow still further the public inter-
est. Accordingly, the Code would have continued to serve the
FCC's public interest if it kept commercialization lower than
the maximum level allowed by market forces, just as it fur-
thered the public interest by keeping commercialization below
the FCC's sixteen-minute commercial guideline. Thus, the
public interest of the antitrust laws which bars such private
regulation can be viewed as inconsistent with the public inter-
est of the broadcasting industry, even in a deregulated
industry.
VII
The Effect of Broadcasters on Deregulation of the
Television Industry
The deregulation of radio is significant because it foreshad-
owed the recent deregulation of television. In addition, the
FCC used the same economic model that it applied to radio to
justify its efforts to deregulate television. Thus, a brief discus-
sion of radio deregulation is necessary to place the deregula-
130. The NAB argued "at great length and with considerable vigor" that elimination
of the time standards would inevitably lead to "a substantial increase in the television
time allotted to commercials or regulatory action by the Federal Communications
Commission." Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 166. By implication, the NAB argued that
an increase in competition would lead to an increase in commercialization.
131. See infra text accompanying note 170.
132. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
133. Final Rule, supra note 4.
134. See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
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tion of television in the proper context and to assess the
ramifications of Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II.
A. Public Interest Considerations Involved in the Deregulation of
Radio
In 1979, following the recent impetus to deregulate,135 the
FCC abolished the specific advertising and programming
guidelines insofar as they pertained to commercial radio.136 To
justify its removal of the restrictions, the FCC used a newly
adopted economic model which predicts that marketplace
forces will adequately restrict the maximum total commercial
time to a level which serves the public interest.137 According to
this theory, market forces would work through actual listener
choice; the public would not listen to an overly commercialized
station, thereby prompting such a station to reduce its com-
mercial level in order to compete for its audience. 138 Accord-
ingly, the FCC stated that
the key issues to consider in this proceeding are who is best
able to determine the wants and needs of radio audiences and,
once these wants and needs are recognized, what forces are
most likely to lead licensees to be responsive to them. The eco-
nomic model suggests that, given the status of radio broadcast-
ing today, the marketplace and competitive forces are more
likely to attain these public interest objectives than are regula-
tory guidelines and procedures.'
39
In other words, market forces can set maximum levels of com-
mercialization more efficiently and effectively than can the
FCC. According to the FCC, this action did not constitute a
reversal of the FCC's past determination that commercials are
135. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 114, para. 3 at 459 n.4. Noting that the President
had ordered executive agencies to delete unneeded regulations, the Commission
stated, "Although this Order does not apply to the Commission, which is not an Execu-
tive Agency, it clearly evidences a national policy to reduce the burdens imposed by
unnecessary governmental regulations." Id
136. In re Deregulation of Radio, Report and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Report and Order]. See also In re Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 797 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Reconsideration
Order].
137. Report and Order, supra note 136, app. D, para. 4. For an enlightening argu-
ment supporting a "marketplace" approach to broadcast regulation, see Fowler & Bren-
ner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207 (1982). The
article was written by the chairman of the FCC and his assistant. It provides excellent
insight into the rationale of the FCC as a whole.
138. Report and Order, supra note 136, para. 5 at 1023.
139. Id. para. 4.
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not in the public interest. The FCC simply changed its method
of determining how much commercial time achieves this
goal.
140
Although the economic model adopted by the FCC was
strongly and cogently attacked by those who opposed deregu-
lation,14 1 the FCC ordered removal of the restrictions.142 The
strongest criticism of the model focused on the model's failure
to consider the government-imposed scarcity of broadcasting
licenses. 43 However, the FCC concluded that the scarcity ra-
tionale no longer justified regulating total commercial time.
1'
The FCC stated that the dramatic increase in the number of
radio stations since passage of the Communications Act has
eliminated the need for public interest regulations that were
deemed necessary in 1927.'11 The FCC noted that, while there
were only 681 radio stations in 1927, there were 8654 radio sta-
tions in 1979.146 The increased number of stations, the FCC
concluded, permits the marketplace to determine the "public
interest," whereas the paucity of stations in 1927 required the
government to impose its own conception of the standard.
147
B. Broadcasters and Deregulation of Television Advertising
Since Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II were decided, the
FCC has abolished many of its regulations pertaining to televi-
140. Id.
141. Id. paras. 11-51.
142. One portion of this deregulatory order was overturned by the federal court of
appeals. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413
(D.C. Cir. 1983). The court held that the FCC's decision to eliminate programming logs
was not justified by the FCC's reasoning and analysis. Id. at 1439. Although program-
ming logs are not relevant to this note, this aspect of the case illustrates that the FCC
must satisfy at least some minimal standard of judicial review. The court stated that
the FCC must show that "all relevant factors and available alternatives were given
adequate consideration." Id. at 1426. It held that the FCC should have at least consid-
ered adopting a modified form of programming logs. Id. at 1439.
Significantly, however, the court upheld the Commission's decision to deregulate ra-
dio advertising. The court stated that "the Commission acted well within its discretion
by concluding from the record and its own experience that it is the marketplace and
not regulation that has kept down the level of commercialization." Id. at 1438. Thus,
unless a court determines that the NAB Code was a relevant factor, and that the FCC
failed to consider it in deciding whether to deregulate advertising, it seems unlikely
that a court will overrule an FCC decision to deregulate television advertising.
143. Report and Order, supra note 136, paras. 14-18.
144. Id.
145. Notice of Inquiry, supra note 114, para. 56.
146. Id.
147. Report and Order, supra note 136, para. 15.
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sion.148 This multifaceted ruling eliminates all specific restric-
tions on the total amount of television advertising.
149
In its proposal, the FCC explained its rationale for deregulat-
ing television.150 As with the deregulation of radio, the per-
ceived national policy favoring deregulation prompted the FCC
to propose the elimination of many of its television regula-
tions.'51 Also, the FCC stated that the development of alterna-
tive video media, such as cable television, subscription
television, and video recorders, has subjected the television
broadcasting industry to competitive pressures that were not
previously present.5 2 This increased competition has dimin-
ished the need for regulatory control.'53
The FCC based its proposal to eliminate restrictions on ad-
vertising on statistical data which show that the total commer-
cial time of certain television stations was almost always well
below the imposed limit. 54 Based primarily on these statistics,
the FCC concluded that competitive pressures regulate total
commercial time more effectively than does the FCC sixteen-
minute guideline. The FCC stated, "These figures indicate, we
believe, that market forces are acting to hold commercial prac-
tices far below the guidelines set out in our delegations. If, in
fact, this is true, there may be no further utility in preserving
148. Final Rule, supra note 4.
149. Id. app. A. The Final Rule also eliminated or modified several other major reg-
ulations. These include: (1) the "Ascertainment Requirement," which requires broad-
casters to survey their communities to ascertain the problems of the communities, and
then demonstrate to the FCC that they adjusted their programming to meet those
needs; (2) the "Program Log" requirement, which requires broadcasters to maintain
detailed records concerning programs and commercials that they have broadcast; and
(3) the "Programming Requirements," most of which are described supra note 111.
150. Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note 22, paras. 58-59.
151. Id. para. 36.
152. Id. paras. 26-32.
153. Id. para. 35.
154. Id. para. 46. The statistical data on which this conclusion is based were derived
from an analysis of 60 television stations in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. Id. Of the
60 stations analyzed, 55 stations were network affiliates and 5 were independent sta-
tions. Id. at 37,254. The FCC selected these stations for the sample because they had
recently applied for license renewals; accordingly, their programming logs were easily
accessible. The statistics showed that network affiliates rarely exceeded the NAB
Code limit of 9 minutes of commercials per hour during prime time. Id. In addition,
the network affiliates averaged less than 13 minutes or 11 minutes per hour through-
out the entire day. See infra text accompanying notes 164-67. In comparison, the in-
dependent stations averaged about 8% minutes of commercials per hour each day.
Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note 22, app. C. The FCC noted that
broadcasters exceeded the 16-minute guideline during only .33% of total broadcast
hours for all 60 stations. I& para. 46.
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those guidelines."'55
Apparently, the FCC reasoned that only market forces were
responsible for keeping commercial time below the sixteen-
minute limit. The FCC asserted that two other factors sup-
ported this conclusion. 156 First, broadcasters had voluntarily
complied with the FCC policy regarding commercialization
during children's programs. 57 Second, the number of con-
sumer complaints regarding excessive commercialization had
decreased.
58
In its proposal, the FCC did not seriously consider the possi-
bility that the NAB Code, rather than market forces, might be
responsible for the low levels of commercials. In its Final
Rule, the Commission perfunctorily dismissed comments that
suggested that the Code might have significantly affected the
statistics reported by the Commission. 1 Arguably, however,
the Code provides a far more obvious and logical explanation
for the relatively low levels of total commercial time. The sta-
tistical sample compiled by the FCC consisted of fifty-five net-
work affiliated stations and five independent stations. 60 Since
the three major networks subscribed to the Code,' 6' presuma-
bly their affiliates subscribed to the Code as well. The FCC
recognized that these network affiliates balance their local
commercials with the commercials of the network so as not to
exceed the NAB Code prime time advertising standards. The
FCC noted, "as more time is accounted for by network com-
mercials, less time can be apportioned to local commercials
since the station must not exceed an upper constraint of either
9 minutes, 30 seconds for NAB's prime time limit nor the FCC
guideline of 16 minutes.'
162
Realistically, the FCC sixteen-minute limit would almost
never be exceeded during prime time because the stations
were constrained by the Code's nine and one-half minute max-
imum. Similarly, the Code restricted total commercial time
during children's viewing hours to twelve minutes per hour,
Monday through Friday, and nine and one-half minutes per
155. Id.
156. Id. para. 47.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Final Rule, supra note 4, para. 64.
160. Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note 22, app. C.
161. Broadcasters I, 536 F. Supp. at 152.
162. Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note 22, app. C.
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hour on Saturday and Sunday.163 In short, the NAB Code
prime time and children's advertising standards constituted
substantial restrictions on the total amount of advertising time.
Perhaps the factor which most strongly supports the FCC's
hypothesis is that, on average, total advertising time is below
the maximum levels permitted by the FCC. The FCC calcu-
lated that the average total advertising time during the sample
period was either thirteen and one-half minutes per hour or
eleven minutes per hour, depending on the mathematical
method used to calculate the average. 64 It is potentially very
misleading, however, to argue that market forces must be
keeping advertising time down because, on average, total time
is below the sixteen-minute guideline. Average time does not
illustrate the effects of market forces. What is illustrative is
whether, at any given time, total advertising time is substan-
tially below the maximum limit in force during that time pe-
riod. Obviously, broadcasters that comply with the lower Code
limits will average less than sixteen minutes per hour over the
course of the day, but this lower average is not a result of mar-
ket forces. A station might broadcast sixteen minutes of com-
mercials most hours, but comply with the lower Code time
limits during the other hours (prime time, for example). On
average, the station would be broadcasting less than the FCC's
sixteen-minute limit; yet, at any given time, the station would
be broadcasting the maximum commercial time allowable
under the Code. Therefore, the Code, and not market forces,
may explain why average commercial time is below the FCC
limit.
A hypothetical situation will illustrate this point. Assume, as
did the FCC, that a typical network affiliate broadcasts twenty
hours each day.'65 During the twenty-hour day, the broad-
163. CODE, XIV(2) (c), reprinted in Kahn, supra note 8, at 591. Children's viewing
hours are defined by the Code as "those hours other than prime time in which pro-
grams initially designed primarily for children under 12 years of age are scheduled."
Id.
164. Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note 22, app. C. Under the first
method, the FCC added the average of local commercials each hour (5 minutes) to the
average network-generated commercials each hour (8% minutes): thus, 13%k minutes
per hour. The second method, which the FCC considered to be more accurate, con-
sisted of adding the average local commercial time each day to the average network-
generated commercial time each day, and then dividing the sum by the average
number of hours broadcast by an affiliate each day. Under the second method, stations
broadcast an average of 10 minutes, 52 seconds of commercials each hour. Id.
165. Id.
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caster complies with the NAB prime time restrictions, which
affect three hours each day.'66 In addition, assume that the
broadcaster designates as children's viewing hours five hours
each Saturday and Sunday, and four hours each weekday. The
broadcaster also complies with NAB time standards during the
children's viewing hours. Lastly, assume that the station
broadcasts the maximum sixteen minutes of commercials per
hour at all other times. Such a station would, on average,
broadcast fourteen minutes of commercials each hour over the
course of the day.167 This figure is quite close to the thirteen
and one-half minute per hour average observed by the FCC,
although it is somewhat higher than the other figure of eleven
minutes.
Even if the assumptions in the hypothetical are modified, the
point remains that factors other than market forces may ex-
plain the relatively low levels of commercialization that were
observed by the FCC. By themselves, the NAB restrictions ac-
count for a substantial portion of low time for total advertis-
ing.168  In addition, the FCC's historical aversion to
commercialization 69 may have fostered levels of total advertis-
ing below the sixteen-minute guideline; broadcasters may have





Time hours per time allowed weekly
Period daily week allowed in time period
prime
time 3 7 9.5 199.5
children's
viewing
hours 4 5 12.5 250.0
(weekend) 5 2 9.5 95.0
other
hours
(weekday) 13 5 16.0 1040.0
(weekend) 12 2 16.0 384.0
totals 20 7 - 1968.5
1968.5 (total minutes of advertising allowed during the week) divided by 140 (total
broadcasting hours in a week) = 14.06 (average minutes of advertising each hour).
168. See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 93-120.
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desired a "margin of error" to avoid public interest concerns
when they applied for license renewal.
These two alternative explanations undermine the FCC's
conclusion that market forces are more effective than regula-
tions in maintaining reasonable levels of advertising. There-
fore, the FCC should not have based its decision to deregulate
television advertising on statistics which did not clearly
demonstrate that market forces sufficiently regulate
advertising.
This caveat is especially important now because neither the
Code nor the FCC currently regulates the overcommercializa-
tion of television. The NAB abandoned the Code in 1982.170
Without the Code, the prime time and children's viewing hours
time limits will no longer require low levels of advertising dur-
ing those hours. In addition, broadcasters may view the dereg-
ulation as a reversal of the FCC's traditionally active
involvement in the regulation of advertising and will no longer
limit commercials, as they had in the past, to avoid violating
their public interest requirement under the Communications
Act. 171 Without these two restraining forces, the low levels of
advertising previously observed may disappear.
Vill
Suggested Regulatory Changes
Removal of the Code restrictions should prod the FCC into
taking one of two possible courses of action. First, the FCC
might temporarily replace the NAB's Code standards with reg-
ulations of its own, although it is unlikely that the FCC would
follow such a course. Alternatively, the FCC could initiate a
study of advertising practices which have developed following
removal of the Code restrictions. Such a study would more ac-
curately indicate whether deregulation is advisable.
170. 104 BROADCASTING, Jan. 3, 1983, at 58.
171. Under one proposed option, the FCC stated that it "no longer would consider
in any fashion a television broadcaster's commercial load. This option is premised on
the belief that competition within the video marketplace will serve as an adequate
regulator of commercialization." Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note
22, para. 58. The FCC apparently adopted this approach. Final Rule, supra note 4, pa-
ras. 64-67. The FCC also considered raising the 16-minute guideline or applying the
existing guideline during only parts of the day. Revision of Commercialization Poli-
cies, supra note 22, para. 59.
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A. The Creation of FCC Advertising Standards
Although the FCC approved of the NAB interruption stan-
dard and clearly viewed limitations on overcommercialization
as proper, the FCC has never adopted explicit guidelines as re-
strictive as those of the Code. Perhaps the FCC believed that
specific guidelines would hamper its ability to tailor the public
interest requirement of each station to the needs of the com-
munity in which the station operates. Alternatively, the ab-
sence of specific guidelines could be a manifestation of the
FCC's concern that providing excessively specific guidelines
would infringe on the first amendment rights of broadcast-
ers.172 Indeed, the Supreme Court has encouraged the FCC to
remain flexible in regulating broadcasters:
In this sensitive area so sweeping a concept of governmental
action would go far in practical effect to undermine nearly a
half century of unmistakable congressional purpose to main-
tain-no matter how difficult the task--essentially private
broadcast journalism held only broadly accountable to public
interest standards. To do this Congress, and the [Federal
Communications] Commission as its agent, must remain in a
posture of flexibility to chart a workable 'middle course' in its
quest to preserve a balance between the essential public ac-
countability and the desired private control of the media.1
73
The court in Broadcasters I viewed private control by the
NAB as a violation of the antitrust laws. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine meaningful private control which would not violate
the antitrust laws. Without private or public regulation, com-
mercialization will likely increase, possibly damaging the pub-
lic interest.
The FCC could adopt regulations which set forth maximum
limits on the total time devoted to commercials and the
number of commercials allowable each hour. Although similar
in nature to the restrictions abandoned by the NAB, FCC time
and interruption standards would be superior to the former
Code standards in several respects. Most importantly, the
standards would be adopted, pursuant to statutory guidelines,
after much public input. Arguably, the proper balance be-
172. Report and Statement of Policy Res, supra note 98, at 2313. See also infra note
179.
173. CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120 (1973). The "sweeping...
concept of governmental action" referred to the appellant's allegation that the actions




tween profits and public interest could be more objectively de-
termined by a public agency than by a trade association
directly interested in higher profits. 74 Presumably, the FCC
would give the viewers' interests more weight in setting time
and interruption standards than would the NAB.
As a federal agency, the FCC could impose a multiple-prod-
uct standard if it determined that such a standard was in the
public interest, as the NAB had argued, without violating the
antitrust laws.175 Again, the anti-competitive effects of such a
standard could be carefully weighed in public hearings held by
a public agency, rather than by agreement among members of
a private trade association.
Regulations promulgated by the FCC would surely protect
the public interest better than the private agreements of the
NAB. Furthermore, the FCC should not restrict consideration
of new standards to those adopted in the Code. Having been
tested and applied since 1952, the NAB standards appear to be
the most obvious and workable types of advertising standards.
However, the FCC should evaluate many alternatives submit-
ted during extensive public hearings. In this way, the interests
of the public can be openly balanced against the broadcaster's
needs.
It seems very unlikely, however, that the FCC will adopt
such regulations. The FCC is aggressively trying to eliminate
or reduce regulations. 176 Adopting new regulations would be
contrary to this trend. Furthermore, the FCC has previously
rejected proposals to adopt restrictions similar to those of the
NAB. 77 Thus, although such regulations would serve the pub-
lic interest, it seems unlikely that the FCC would adopt them.
B. Advertising Practices Revisited
Alternatively, the elimination of the Code presents the FCC
with an opportunity to study the effects of removing an exten-
sive system of advertising restrictions and to isolate the effects
of marketplace control. The FCC should specifically inquire:
174. A 1972 FCC study, however, found that NAB restrictions on total advertising
time decreased the revenues of broadcasters. Children's Television Report and Policy
Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 12 (1972). This result would indicate that the NAB instituted
the Code restrictions to avoid FCC regulation, rather than to increase their revenues.
175. Broadcasters II, 553 F. Supp. at 625.
176. See supra notes 131-71 and accompanying text.
177. In re Adoption of Standards for the Elimination of Television Overcommercial-
ization in the Public Interest, 49 RAD. REG. (P & F) 2d 391 (1981).
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1. Has total commercial time increased?
2. Have commercial interruptions increased?
3. Has "clutter" increased?
4. What effect has removal of the Code had on children's
advertising?
5. Have the ethics imposed on broadcasters by the Code
disappeared along with the Code?
Rarely has a regulatory agency had such an opportunity to
observe the effects of removing regulations. The FCC can ef-
fectively compare the nature of advertising under the highly
organized set of regulations with the nature of advertising con-
strained only by market forces.
Such a study would provide the FCC with an intelligent ba-
sis for deciding whether to maintain its deregulated posture re-
garding television advertising. For example, the FCC might
find that there were few changes in advertising practices after
the elimination of the Code. Such a finding would suggest that
market forces do, indeed, control advertising practices and that
the FCC could safely loosen its costly regulatory system with-
out damaging the public interest. Alternatively, the FCC might
find that only certain aspects of current advertising practices
require regulation to protect the public interest. The FCC
could then accurately target regulations to those practices that
the marketplace does not control, while leaving other areas un-
regulated. Such a study would clearly test the advisability of
the Commission's deregulation of television advertising.
Unlike the statistics reported by the FCC in conjunction with
its proposal to deregulate television advertising,'78 a post-Code
study would be unaffected by the Code's total time restrictions
and the perceived FCC attitude of discouraging advertising.
Statistics obtained after the elimination of the Code and after
the FCC's recent tolerance for increased commercialization
would truly reflect the way in which the market forces control
total advertising time.
This note does not suggest that the FCC abandon its deregu-
lation of television advertising. Indeed, the FCC should elimi-
nate its costly regulations if market forces will keep
advertising at acceptable levels. The FCC should, however,
reevaluate its decision to deregulate television advertising un-
til it has had an opportunity to study advertising levels which
178. Revision of Commercialization Policies, supra note 22.
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have existed since the Code's elimination. Only since the
Code's elimination has the FCC had the opportunity to accu-
rately study the effects of market forces.
IX
Conclusion
Although the FCC has never imposed advertising guidelines
as restrictive as those of the NAB Code, the FCC has, until re-
cently, remained resolute in its opposition to excessive com-
mercialization. In the absence of specific FCC guidelines, the
broadcasters developed their own guidelines regarding com-
mercial advertising. Tacitly approved by the Commission, the
Code guidelines allowed broadcasters to maximize profits
within certain parameters without having to jeopardize their
precarious licenses. Although the degree to which the FCC ac-
tually approved of the Code standards is unclear, the FCC
never disapproved the standards, despite numerous opportuni-
ties to do so. It appears that the FCC gratefully allowed the
NAB to promulgate regulations that it was unwilling to impose
on the industry.
179
In approving the elimination of the NAB Code standards,
179. Indeed, Writers Guild of Am. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated
on other grounds, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980), also illus-
trates the symbiotic relationship which exists at times between the FCC and the NAB.
In Writers Guild, the trial court found that the FCC had successfully pressured the
NAB into adopting a "family viewing hours" policy, w.hich the FCC itself was unwilling
to impose on broadcasters. The court stated:
The court finds that Chairman Wiley in the course of his campaign threatened
the industry with regulatory action if it did not adopt the essence of his sched-
uling proposals. On some occasions, when the persuasive demands of the situ-
ation so dictated, he would withdraw his threats or assume a low profile. But
the Commission's pressure in this case was persistent, pronounced, and un-
mistakable. Chairman Wiley's actions were the direct cause of the implemen-
tation of the family viewing policy: were it not for the pressure he exerted, it
would not have been adopted by any of the networks nor by the NAB. The
threat of regulatory action was not only a substantial factor leading to its adop-
tion but a crucial, necessary, and indispensable cause.
423 F. Supp. at 1094.
The NAB Family Viewing Policy prevented NAB members from televising
" e ] ntertainment programming inappropriate for viewing by a general family audience
... during the first hour of network entertainment programming in prime time and in
the immediately preceding hour." Writers Guild, 423 F. Supp. at 1072 (quoting NAB,
The Television Code 2-3 (18th ed. June 1975)). A congressional committee had pres-
sured the FCC to regulate violence and obscenity on television, but the FCC decided
that it would only impose such regulations indirectly because the Commission feared
that the rules would constitute infringements on first amendment rights and 47 U.S.C.
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Broadcasters II illustrates the ironic and probably unintended
results which occur when courts interpret one statutory
scheme without regard to other articulated public policy goals.
The antitrust laws mandate a narrow definition of public inter-
est, even at the expense of the public interest served by the
Communications Act. Although Broadcasters I and Broadcast-
ers II had the undesirable effect of damaging a broader public
interest, it is possible that the decision may yet have some un-
intended, but beneficial, results.
Most significantly, Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II may
force the FCC to reassume its statutory role as the arbiter of
the public interest-a function which the NAB had, in essence,
performed for the FCC in the area of advertising. By prevent-
ing the NAB from developing and enforcing industry standards
regarding advertising practices, the court has, perhaps inad-
vertently, forced the television industry to look once again to
the FCC for the meaning of public interest in this area. How-
ever, Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II have thrust this duty
upon the FCC at a time when the Commission is trying to dele-
gate this decision-making function to the marketplace. Thus,
the benefits that might result from forcing the public interest
determination back to a public agency may be lost.
§ 326. Id. See also Writers Guild of Am. v. American Broadcasting, 609 F.2d 355, 359
(9th Cir. 1979).
The trial court in Writers Guild noted that the NAB could have imposed similar reg-
ulations on its own initiative; however, the FCC was so extensively involved with the
creation of the NAB regulations, see, e.g., Writers Guild, 423 F. Supp. at 1094-1120, that
the NAB regulations represented state action. Accordingly, the family viewing policies
constituted government censorship in violation of the first amendment. Writers Guild,
423 F. Supp. at 1140-43. That court's decision was vacated, however, on the grounds
that the FCC, not the federal courts, had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's complaints.
Writers Guild of Am. v. American Broadcasting, 609 F.2d at 358.
Children's programming policies also illustrate this symbiotic relationship between
the FCC and NAB. While the FCC was considering whether to place strict limits on
advertising during children's viewing hours, the NAB adopted its own limits on adver-
tising during children's viewing hours. The Commission observed:
Recently, following extensive discussions with the Commission's Chairman,
the National Association of Broadcasters agreed to amend its code to limit
non-program material on children's programs to nine minutes and thirty
seconds per hour on weekends and twelve minutes during the week by 1976;
the Association of Independent Television Stations (INTV) has agreed to re-
duce advertising voluntarily to the same level. By these actions the industry
has indicated that these are advertising levels which can be maintained while
continuing to improve service to children.
Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C. 1, para. 39 (1974). Thus,
in several instances, the FCC has imposed regulations on the television industry infor-
mally by pressuring various industry trade associations.
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Moreover, the FCC's justification for delegating public inter-
est decisions regarding television advertising to the market-
place has been undermined by the removal of the Code. The
FCC's study attributing low levels of advertising to market
forces failed to consider the effects that the Code may have
had on these levels. Elimination of the Code has now changed
the nature of the forces controlling advertising practices.
The FCC's recent deregulation of television advertising rep-
resents a dramatic deviation from the FCC's traditional poli-
cies regarding television advertising. In light of the FCC's
traditional concern with overcommercialization, it seems quite
possible that the current fervor to deregulate advertising may
not last beyond the terms of the current commissioners. The
compelling logic that has traditionally justified minimizing
commercial excesses may reemerge once the current political
climate encouraging deregulation has changed; when it does,
the FCC may wish to revitalize regulation of advertising as a
means of promoting the public interest.
If the FCC reinstitutes control over advertising at some later
time, it may ameliorate some of the damage to the public inter-
est which was caused by Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II. If
the FCC does not reassert control over television advertising,
Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II may have damaged the
public interest in two ways: the possible increase in commer-
cialization will decrease viewer enjoyment, and removal of the
Code will have undermined the FCC's basis for proposing
deregulation.
Thus, whether Broadcasters I and Broadcasters II ultimately
damage or benefit the public interest, beyond the narrow scope
of the antitrust conception of public interest, depends on FCC
reactions to the Broadcasters decisions. Hopefully, the FCC
will reevaluate its policies in light of the changes caused by
removal of the NAB Code.
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